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ARTICLE 
The Lawyer as Process Advocate: 
 Encouraging Collaborative Approaches to 
Controversial Development Decisions 
SEAN F. NOLON*
INTRODUCTION 
 
On most nights, in most communities, a public hearing on an 
application for senior housing would bring out an angry mob of 
neighbors.  However, on this night, neighbor after neighbor 
approaches the microphone to encourage the local government to 
approve the application submitted by the developer.  The 
developer’s lawyer turns to him and says, “What’s going on here?  
I’ve never seen anything like this in my life.”  What was different 
about this proposal that changed the dynamic from hostile to 
productive?  Can it be repeated?  Why did this come as such a 
surprise to the attorney?  Can this process be abused, allowing 
parties to be taken advantage of?  Answers to these questions and 
others will be explored with the help of four case studies 
highlighting the use of collaboration to manage development 
conflicts requiring land use approvals from the local government.  
Based on lessons from these examples, the author presents a 
framework to help lawyers who want to play a larger role in 
promoting and facilitating similar collaborations. 
Much like Eris’s golden apple of discord,1
 
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Dispute Resolution 
Program, Vermont Law School. The author would like to thank to Margaret 
Byerly, Brian Jones and Crystal Heide for research assistance, Richard Brooks 
and Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold for comments on earlier versions and, 
especially, Theodore Kheel for his leadership in the area of environmental 
awareness and dispute resolution. 
 a significant 
development proposal can incite hostility in an otherwise peaceful 
community dashing any hope for achieving greater community 
benefit.  Significant development proposals can be seen as 
 1. THOMAS BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY 211 (Crown Publishers 1979) 
(1913). 
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unwanted threats causing irreversible change or great 
opportunities to provide critical resources to ailing communities.2
Specifically, this article deals with situations where 
development is likely to occur, the development will have a large 
impact on the community, the governmental decision makers 
have discretion over what can be approved, and opposition is 
likely.  Typically, in these types of situations community benefit 
is not maximized because the decision is limited to compromises 
that only satisfy the lowest common denominator and do little to 
create value.  Conventional wisdom holds that little can be done 
to make the governmental decision-making process more 
productive.  However, the practice and theory of dispute 
resolution, collaboration and conflict management suggests 
otherwise.
  
Typically, these development decisions involve significant 
controversy and produce unsatisfying results.  They can result in 
destroyed environmental resources, wasted money, divided 
community and loss of opportunities for mutual gain.  Why do 
these proposals become such battlegrounds—polarizing 
neighbors, frustrating developers, paralyzing local officials, and 
producing unsatisfying results? 
3
The effects of process are often not given appropriate 
consideration when planning for a significant land use 
development.  The applicant often views the facts and the law 
that supports his position as the most important factor in 
determining the outcome of a decision; leaving process as 
secondary.  For example, proponents will point to studies that 
show positive tax benefits of a project as justification for approval 
while opponents present evidence that the infrastructure cannot 
 
 
 2. Elsa Brenner, Yonkers Mayor Wants Action on Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 2008. 
 3. See, e.g., Edith Netter, Using Mediation to Resolve Land Use Disputes, in 
ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 179 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 1992); 
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES: THE 
NEW WAY TO RUN MEETINGS, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS (2006); 
BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY 
PROBLEMS (1989); JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKING 
COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT (2000). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/5
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support the proposal as justification for denial.4  The parties 
engage in an adversarial process and expect that verifiable data, 
applicable law, and the force of their convictions will produce the 
desired result.5
Process plays a central role in influencing what substantive 
possibilities the parties will consider.  Highly competitive 
processes only consider a narrow set of outcomes.  In more 
cooperative processes, where parties are able to explore 
alternatives, a broader range of outcomes can be considered.  
Since controversial development decisions, like the ones in Part 
II, resist narrow solutions, limiting oneself to a strict competitive 
approach is inappropriate.  Satisfying the range of issues in these 
complicated matters requires broad thinking and, therefore, the 
integration of collaborative approaches.  The use of concept 
committees in the four case studies offers one example of how to 
integrate these approaches. 
  While facts are indeed important, the process 
used to present and deliberate the facts is also important.  A good 
process can improve the substantive options by uncovering new 
information and discovering new connections.  For example, even 
if a development could benefit all parties involved, a process that 
stokes hostility and promotes mistrust will eliminate any 
opportunities to capture that benefit.  The process by which the 
developer crafts the proposal and the community engages in 
response will either create or eliminate options for satisfactory 
outcomes.  Many parties fail to recognize that they have the 
ability to choose a process and that choice of process will 
determine the outcome as much as, if not more than, the 
substantive characteristics of the proposal. 
To help parties take advantage of these opportunities 
lawyers must play a more central and active role in advocating 
for good process.  Lawyers are embedded in all aspects of local 
decisions—they formally represent applicants, opponents, and 
decision makers, they informally advise through casual 
conversations and opinion, they are members of the community, 
maybe the applicant themselves, and frequently are members of 
 
 4. See RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND 
POLICIES (1966); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE 
IMPASSE (1987). 
 5. Barbara McAdoo & Larry Bakken, Local Government Use of Mediation 
for Resolution of Public Disputes, 22 URB. LAW. 179, 183 (1990). 
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the local government.  When process decisions are being made by 
the applicant, opponents or the local government lawyers are 
actively involved.  Too often, however, these lawyers miss the 
opportunity to counsel clients on appropriate process.  Lawyers 
mistakenly limit their participation to counseling on substantive 
legal advice or procedural advice limited to what the law requires 
instead of what it allows. 
This article is organized to help lawyers provide procedural 
advice so that their clients can participate effectively and 
efficiently in a collaborative process without compromising legal 
entitlements.  Using the four cases and exploring relevant 
scholarship, the author provides an accessible framework for 
attorneys who are involved in conflicts over land development.  
Part I examines why the required process is adversarial and what 
consequences that has for significant development decisions.  
Part II presents the four case studies that illustrate how 
collaborative approaches were used effectively in several 
significant development decisions.  Each example describes how a 
group of interested citizens participated as part of a concept 
committee to provide pre-application input into a development 
proposal.  Part III provides a framework of six lessons to help 
lawyers be more effective process advocates. 
I.  LIMITATIONS OF THE REQUIRED PROCESS 
 A.  Local Government and Land Use 
In the United States, the primary authority to approve the 
development of land has been delegated to local governments.6
 
 6. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE 
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 47 (2d ed. 2007) (pointing out 
that this is not a blanket delegation and there is a tremendous range of 
delegations among the fifty states); Craig Anthony Arnold, The Structure of the 
Land Use Regulatory System in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
441 (2007) (noting that the land use regulatory system is located primarily at 
the local level of governance in the United States, despite the rise of federal and 
state statutes and regulations that govern certain aspects of land use); Erin 
Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in 
Land Use Planning Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337, 341 (2002) (discussing 
how local governments vigorously wield the police power to protect various 
public interests in land use). 
  
This includes towns, townships, villages and cities at the sub-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/5
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county level.  According to the Census Bureau there are over 
35,000 local governments.7  When making land use decisions, 
local governments must do so pursuant to specific authorizations 
and detailed procedures.8  State enabling laws create the 
structure for this system that allows local governments to control 
the development of land.9  While each state has a different 
system, the overall structure has many similarities.10
The land use system has both substantive and procedural 
requirements. Substantive requirements specify where 
  This 
section looks at how decisions are made in this system, why 
certain procedures are followed, when procedures work well, and 
why they fail when trying to address significant development 
proposals like those in Part II. 
 
 7. U.S. Census Bureau, The U.S. Census of Governments, available at 
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/cog/2007/techdocgovorg.pdf. 
 8. BARLOW BURKE, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE 
CONTROLS 6 (2d ed. 2009).  
[A]ny activity the municipal government undertakes: (1) must be 
expressly authorized by the state legislature—it must be authorized in 
express words in a state statute, or (2) it must be reasonably necessary to 
the achievement of an activity that is expressly authorized—it must be 
incidental to an express authorization; or (3) it must be essential to the 
declared objects and purposes of the municipality.  
Id. 
 9. Id. at 8 (noting “[t]here is no inherent municipal power to zone. Neither 
does such a power spring from the creation of a municipal corporation or local 
government. Absent home rule powers, some specific state enabling act or 
statutory authority is required. Such authority in fact exists today in every 
state.”); see also John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use 
System: A Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 
in LAND USE LAW FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 581 (noting that “states 
retain[ ] the power to define and limit property rights . . . From that reservoir of 
authority, states have delegated land use control principally to local 
governments.”). 
 10. BABCOCK, supra note 4, at 157.   
It is reasonable to expect, from municipality to municipality, differences 
in substantive goals and objectives, and it is not essential to procedural 
due process that there be uniformity in procedure among the hundreds of 
municipalities in each state. But substantial uniformity of local 
procedure will be an inevitable consequence of an insistence by the state 
that each community that elects to regulate land use maintain a 
procedural system that contributes to fairness and openness in local 
administration.  
Id. 
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development can occur and how it can be built.  Specifying a 
development envelope, allowing density bonuses, and defining to 
what extent scenic resources can limit development potential are 
all examples of substantive requirements; federal, state and local 
provisions all serve as sources for this authority.  For example, a 
local law or decision must not violate the “takings” clause of the 
federal constitution by taking land without just compensation.11  
Federal telecommunications law prohibits local boards from 
regulating cell towers based on health effects.12  State enabling 
laws prescribe what local governments can regulate and what 
they cannot.13  With this authority, local governments can enact 
laws to create zones that segregate uses into districts and 
describe how development will take place on the land.14
B.  THE REQUIRED PROCESS 
  From 
these substantive requirements landowners have a general idea 
of what is allowed on their land and how it can be built. 
Procedural requirements dictate what process a local 
government must follow in order to take substantive action.15  
These procedural requirements apply to such legislative actions 
as adopting a zoning ordinance and to administrative action such 
as a subdivision application, as well as judicial actions like 
variances and interpretations.16
 
 11. The 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits deprivation 
of property without due process of law is made applicable to the states and local 
governments through the 14th Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1; see also ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD M. 
FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1999). 
  Examples include: time frames 
for providing notice of the proposal; who should be notified; 
duration of public hearings; filing requirements at the local, 
regional and state level; time frames for decision making; record 
 12. See Laurie Dichiara, Wireless Communication Facilities: Siting For Sore 
Eyes, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (1998). 
 13. BURKE, supra note 8, at 161 (observing that “[i]n enacting any 
amendment, municipal legislatures must follow the procedures set out in their 
own enabling statutes.”). 
 14. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 15. BURKE, supra note 8, at 161 (citing Riggs v. Twp. of Long Beach, 538 A.2d 
808, 812-13 (N.J. 1988)); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 2.41 
to .43, § 6.67 (5th ed. 2003). 
 16. MANDELKER, supra note 15, §§ 6.67 to .76. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/5
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keeping; time frames for appealing a decision; the standard of 
review on appeal; what constitutes a conflict of interest; as well 
as technical specifications for the underlying application.17  If a 
decision fails to follow one of these requirements and is appealed, 
it can be overturned on procedural grounds even if it is, in 
substance, the correct decision.18
Again, local governments must look to federal, state and local 
law to make sure they follow the proper decision-making 
structure.  For example, local administrative decisions must 
provide for due process protections.
 
19  State law requires a local 
government to hold a public hearing within a required number of 
days after accepting an application20 and must document its 
action in accordance with sunshine laws.21  A local government 
can enact rules to define when an application is deemed 
complete.22
The required process at the local level is a mosaic of 
requirements from federal and state constitutions, statutes and 
regulations, local and regional laws, as well as locally adopted 
board procedures.
 
23  Unlike federal agencies, which must comply 
with the Administrative Procedures Act,24 each local government 
has a different set of procedures.  The process varies from state to 
state, county to county and municipality to municipality.25
 
 17. Id. § 6.70. 
  With 
 18. In re City of Schenectady v. Flacke, 475 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1984); In re Envtl. Defense Fund v. Flacke, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1983) (holding “[w]e must determine whether the entities involved have 
complied with the procedural requirements. . .” (citing In re Cohalan v. Carey, 
452 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)). 
 19. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 1.01. 
 20. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(5)(d) (McKinney 2009). 
 21. See, e.g., The Freedom of Information Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF.Law §§ 84-90 
(McKinney 2009); The Open Meetings Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF. Law §§ 100-111 
(McKinney 2009). 
 22. KAREN SCHNELLER-MACDONALD ET AL., TOWN OF MILAN PLANNING BD., 
HABITAT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES (2005), available at http://www.ecosny.org/conf 
erences/Sustaining%20conf%20Feb%202%202007%20presentations/milanhabita
tassessmentguidelinesfinal-12-06-05.pdf. 
 23. Arnold, supra note 6, at 449, 487, 490-91. 
 24. Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-554 (2006) (creating a 
framework for decision making and review of agency actions). 
 25. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 1.16. 
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over 35,000 local government entities in the United States26
While the required process is different in each jurisdiction, it 
generally follows four basic stages: (1) an application is accepted 
by the board; (2) the board deliberates; (3) the board solicits 
public comment; and (4) the board makes a decision.
 the 
variety is impressive.  For the purposes of this article, however, 
there are sufficient similarities among all these local 
governments to draw parallels and construct a working model. 
27  Beyond 
these four stages, the process in each community varies 
depending on the type of action28 and the jurisdiction.29
Being a subdivision of state governments in a federal system, 
the required process at the local level is informed by the 
governmental structures at the other levels.  The three functions 
of government—executive (administrative), legislative and 
judicial—present at the federal and state level are also found at 
the local level.
  
Governmental decision-makers are typically aware of the local 
requirements but frequently rely on advice from attorneys and 
clerks on how procedure applies in specific situations.  In most 
situations, when asked about appropriate process, the advising 
attorneys explain what procedures must be followed.  Lawyers 
rarely provide information about what other processes can be 
used and the advantages and disadvantages of other processes.  
Few lawyers are aware that the required process can be 
supplemented and that it may be beneficial to do so. 
30
 
 26. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 7. The U.S. Census of 2007 counts 
36,011 sub-county general-purpose governmental entities. If we include 
counties, which often have some form of land use control, the number is 
obviously higher. 
  While these functions are neatly housed in 
branches of federal and state governments, the structure at the 
local level is not so tidy.  For example, the local chief elected 
official (mayor, first selectman, supervisor, etc.) may perform 
some executive functions and may perform some legislative 
 27. This structure loosely follows trial like proceedings. See BURKE, supra 
note 8, at 157; cf. BABCOCK, supra note 4, at 154 (finding that “local 
administrative practices vary from some resemblance to rules for judicial 
hearings to the most colloquial proceedings”). 
 28. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 6.70. 
 29. Id. § 1.16. 
 30. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6,  § 5.9. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/5
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functions.31  She may sit as a member of the local legislature and 
vote on legislation32 and she may or may not have veto 
authority.33  Similarly, the legislative body, in addition to having 
legislative responsibilities, may have executive powers to appoint 
and oversee the staff that administers the local laws.34  While 
some communities have judicial boards to interpret zoning laws 
and hear variances,35 others rely on the state judicial system to 
perform this function.36  Despite this dizzying variety, for the 
purposes of this article, it is important to remember that at the 
local level, executive, legislative, and judicial functions exist, but 
are carried out by different entities depending on the type of 
proposal.37
Significant development proposals may require approvals 
that engage all three of these governmental functions from 
inception to implementation.  A developer may request a change 
to the law that would require a legislative action such as a 
rezoning or an amendment to the comprehensive plan.  If 
granted, the developer will then need to go through an 
administrative process to get approval for the proposal before 
 
 
 31. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 223 (2d ed. 2001).   
The tripartite division of the federal and state governments into 
independent branches is not reflected in the set-up of a great many cities. 
The mayor of a city is, for instance, generally not an exclusively executive 
officer and does not enjoy immunity from the subpoena powers of the 
legislative branch. There is much overlapping of administrative, 
legislative, and even judicial functions among municipal organs—and 
ideally, much cooperation.  
Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 58 (stating that in a weak-mayor format, the mayor has little, if 
any veto power, while in a strong-mayor format, the mayor has veto power over 
most legislation). 
 34. See id. 
 35. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, § 5.32. 
 36. Id. 
 37. In some communities, a planning board serves as the principal 
administrative board, hearing most subdivision and site plan applications. 
There may, however, be certain decisions over which the local legislature retains 
administrative authority to grant site plans and subdivision in areas of critical 
importance. See, e.g., Jayne E. Daly, What's Really Needed to Effectuate 
Resource Protection in Communities, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 193 (2002) 
(explaining how the Town of Dover in New York reserved site plan approval for 
all parcels in the “Mixed Use Institutional Conversion Overlay” zone). 
9
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beginning to develop.  After the administrative approval, the 
project may need a variance from the quasi-judicial entity.  After 
all these approvals, construction can begin and will likely be 
monitored by an enforcement officer to ensure compliance with 
permit conditions.  Depending on the proposal and the 
community, these separate functions may or may not be 
performed by the same entity. 
Regardless of the function the government is performing, the 
required process organizes interactions and communications to be 
directed at the governmental body.  This separates the applicant 
from the community and discourages communication across the 
divide.  In the required process, the landowner submits the 
application and the community can only participate at designated 
opportunities.  Participation required by law is limited to 
providing comments, in person or in writing, in response to the 
submitted application at a public hearing.  Once sufficient 
information is collected, the government then rules based on 
evidence and relevant law.38
 C.  When the Required Process Works Well 
  Because this process is deliberately 
designed to be like a trial, the parties see each other as 
adversaries competing in front of the governmental body.  In 
routine land development matters, this adversarial dynamic does 
not interfere with good decision-making; in significant land 
development matters, it presents a considerable obstacle. 
For routine decisions—where the government has limited 
discretion, understands how to apply the governing regulations, 
implicates few parties, and presents a limited number of issues to 
be resolved—the required process works well.  In these 
situations, a landowner submits the application, it is reviewed, 
there is an opportunity to be heard, and the government makes a 
decision in a timely manner.  When a party’s interests are 
consistent with the rights codified in the existing law the 
required process will likely produce a satisfying outcome.  In 
these situations, the required process is efficient, effective, and 
predictable.  A majority of the development decisions fall into this 
 
 38. MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 6.70. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/5
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category.39
 D.  Limitations of the Required Process 
  As a result, most of a government’s decisions are 
handled in a timely manner through the required process. 
The required process, while efficient, is also adversarial.  The 
government is the ultimate decision-maker and the parties 
participate in a trial-like environment to present their 
arguments.  Parties may work out a compromise, but it is likely 
to be limited in scope and must be approved by the government.  
What typically happens is that parties become consumed with 
winning the battle instead of working constructively to identify 
an appropriate solution.40  Their interactions can become fueled 
by misinformation and fear, causing them to spend significant 
resources attempting to advance their position by spinning facts, 
undermining the other parties, and fighting over procedure.  For 
the applicant, the process can force her to engage in competitive 
behaviors that encourage deception, manipulation, and, in some 
cases, corruption.41  For neighbors, they may work to prevent 
inquiry into appropriate solutions, while attacking the applicant 
and intimidating the government with threats of political 
retribution.42  For the government, it becomes more about 
surviving and making a defensible decision than achieving a 
pareto-optimal solution.43
Unfortunately, parties typically assume that required 
processes cannot be supplemented because they equate “required” 
with “exclusive.”  While the required process does specify what a 
board must do in order to make a decision, the required process 
imposes a minimum, not a maximum.  The government must hold 
a public hearing, the applicant must notify adjacent property 
owners, and the government must make a decision within a given 
 
 
 39. Phil Kenkel, Cooperative Management Series: Effective Decision 
Making in the Board Room, OKLA. COOP. EXTENSION SERV. (n.d.), 
http://pods.dasnr.okstate.edu/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-1784/AGEC979 
web.pdf   
 40. SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND CITIZENS’ GROUPS 16 (2d ed. 
2001). 
 41. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE, supra note 4, at 3-13. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
11
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time frame.  These mandates do not bar the government from 
suggesting or requiring additional procedures in appropriate 
circumstances.44  Some governments have enacted pre-
application procedures,45 others have extended the notice 
provisions to include more than the minimum number of 
participants,46 while still others have held extensive 
informational sessions that go far beyond what is required at a 
public hearing.47  Governments have ample authority to 
supplement the required process when an adversarial process will 
limit the creativity needed to advance and protect their 
constituents’ needs.48
II.  SUPPLEMENTING THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS 
TO FOSTER COLLABORATION 
  If lawyers are aware that the required 
process is a floor and not a ceiling, that the required process is 
adversarial, and that adversarial processes stifle creativity, they 
will be more likely to suggest and participate in supplemental 
procedures. 
The following development case studies illustrate how parties 
can take advantage of opportunities presented by collaborative 
approaches.49
 
 44. In re Merson v. McNally, 688 N.E.2d 479 (N.Y. 1997) (sanctioning 
informal, voluntary, multi-party negotiations during local environmental review 
process); State Environmental Quality Review Act, N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & 
REGS. tit. 6, §§ 617.3, 617.2(b)(1) (2009) (waiving applicable time periods for 
environmental reviews); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(8) (McKinney 2009) (allowing 
subdivision time frames to be extended by mutual consent of owner and 
planning board). 
  Using these examples, we can see how the 
 45. See SCHNELLER-MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 22. 
 46. Town of Gardiner, N.Y., TOWN CODE ch. 160 (2005) (extending the area of 
notification regarding applications and public hearings). 
 47. Consensus Building Institute, Streamlining Community Planning in 
Falmouth, Maine, http://cbuilding.org/publication/case/streamlining-community-
planning-falmouth-maine (last visited Dec. 15, 2009) (describing how this 
community used a volunteer stakeholder advisory committee to improve the 
land use system). 
 48. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 49. A subcommittee of The Westchester County Executive’s Task Force on 
Environment and Development that has first-hand experience with this new 
approach worked with Pace University’s Land Use Law Center to document 
these cases. SEAN F. NOLON & EMILY M. BECK, COLLABORATIVE DEVELOPMENTS: A 
REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT APPROVALS ACHIEVED THROUGH COLLABORATION (Sept. 
10, 2003) (on file with author). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/5
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required approval processes can be supplemented to be creative 
and less adversarial while still protecting clients’ interests.  
These cases involved significant development decisions and used 
a range of collaborative processes to produce proposals that 
united and satisfied more than they divided and infuriated.  In all 
of these cases, an application to develop a specific parcel had been 
submitted or was likely to be submitted to the local government, 
key parties decided that using predominately collaborative 
techniques presented significant advantages over predominantly 
adversarial techniques, and use of those techniques resulted in an 
approval that enjoyed widespread support.  The process was still 
difficult, challenging and, at times, frustrating, but the overall 
experience was productive and the outcomes more satisfying than 
not. 
Each case is organized to provide a description of the 
proposal, details about the subject parcel, the process used, and 
summaries of the parties’ experience.  In some of these examples, 
applicants and government officials, involved residents early in 
the process, sometimes even before triggering the required 
process.  Information for the case studies was obtained from 
interviews of the participants, during which they were 
encouraged to offer their critical assessment.  Segments of these 
interviews are included to provide their perspective.  Accordingly, 
no project is portrayed as perfect.  Despite some critical 
comments, the developers, local officials, and residents listed 
many incentives to employing collaborative processes. 
 A.  From Senior Housing to Clustered Single Family 
The developer acquired a seven-acre parcel with an eighty-
six-bed nursing home that had recently been closed.  Their 
original plan was to turn it into affordable apartment housing for 
senior citizens.  Based on meetings with officials and neighbors, 
the developer felt there was sufficient support to proceed with 
applications for zoning approval and to the state for affordable-
housing tax credits.  The developers learned that the zoning code 
would also permit a subdivision into approximately twenty lots 
for single-family residences, but considered the senior housing 
plan more suited for the property.  Notwithstanding developer’s 
preference, however, the property was developed as clustered 
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single-family homes—the result of conversation with neighbors 
who stood to be most affected by the project.  
The developer created a process to engage the twenty-four 
adjacent neighbors and provide them with a choice of what could 
be built.  Another fifteen were included after they registered a 
complaint that they had been left out.  Over the course of two to 
three months, approximately six meetings were held.  There were 
no ground rules or formal agendas; and the developer decided 
who would participate in the meetings, as well as their timing 
and content.  Officials were in favor of the process, and indicated 
that the municipality would support the residents’ decision.  
Residents were also encouraged to visit recent projects of the 
developer in nearby communities.  At the final meeting, the 
residents were presented with alternative site plans for senior 
housing, a clustered development of eighteen single-family homes 
with a conservation easement on the perimeter, and a 
conventional twenty-two, lot subdivision.  The developer 
indicated his preference for senior housing, but made it clear that 
the decision was the residents’ as long as they would continue to 
support the project throughout the planning process.  After 
questions, a vote was taken where all but one family chose the 
clustered single-family housing development. 
A leading official was himself in favor of affordable housing 
for senior citizens, pointing out the advantages over single family 
homes: a larger tax base, preservation of more open space, no 
burden on the schools, a minimal increase in traffic, and less need 
for emergency services.  In his view, the final plan benefits a 
handful of homeowners to the detriment of the community.  But 
while he wishes the developer had made more of an effort to sway 
residents in favor of affordable housing, the official is enthusiastic 
about what he described as an “excellent, democratic” process. 
The developer felt that if they had insisted on proceeding 
with senior housing on the site, the project would not have been 
built.  They also note that they were not required to prepare an 
environmental impact statement for single family homes and 
accordingly saved a great deal of time and money.  Asked 
whether a mediator would have improved the process, they said 
“no”—that in fact a mediator might have created a barrier 
between them and the residents, who were “open and delighted to 
be asked to participate” in the decision-making process.  The 
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developer noted that the success of the consensual approach 
depends on the menu of choices that can be offered the 
community and what is feasible for the developer. 
A homeowner who attended many of the meetings said that 
although several residents initially reacted to the developer with 
suspicion, he won over many with his candor—admitting, for 
example, that he would need to construct at least seventeen 
homes in order to recoup his investment.  This person did not 
believe a mediator would have appreciably improved the process; 
she felt that the developer handled the residents well and was 
effective in getting those who supported the project to help win 
zoning approval through their participation in official meetings. 
One couple that was interviewed was among the two or three 
households that preferred housing for senior citizens on the site.  
They said that many other residents also supported this plan at 
first, but changed their minds in favor of single-family homes 
when a well-respected fellow neighbor pointed out that property 
values would increase if single-family residences were built on 
the property.  Notwithstanding the couple’s disagreement with 
the final result, they praised the developer for his flexible 
attitude.  In fact, they add, meetings became social gatherings 
that neighbors looked forward to, and everyone was able to know 
each other a little better. 
The neighbor who steered people toward the plan for single-
family homes lives nearby the site of the old nursing home.  Her 
memory is that only two people initially supported affordable 
senior housing; most were opposed to the concept of a large 
apartment building and some, apparently, to the “affordable” 
aspect.  Once they learned of the option of clustering homes on a 
portion of the property and creating the “magnificent buffer zone” 
around them, the neighbors were firmly behind the single 
residences plan.  This person is enthusiastic about her experience 
with the consensus building process, and considers the developer 
to have done an excellent job of communicating with the residents 
and of preserving the land. 
 B.  Rezoning from Single Family to Townhouses 
The 254-acre parcel was zoned for single-family subdivision 
but the developer was not sure it was the best use for the 
property.  The developer asked the municipality to establish a 
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concept committee to explore alternative plans for the property.  
As a result of the process, the zoning was changed to allow a golf 
course, eighty-five townhomes, two single-family homes and 
sixty-three acres of open space.  According to the Consensus 
Memorandum issued by the concept committee, the golf course 
was to be “environmentally friendly”.  The committee’s support of 
the project was expressly premised on the development of 
safeguards against compromising quality of the downstream 
reservoirs and ongoing monitoring and testing. 
The developer and the municipality selected the participants 
for the committee after soliciting volunteers.  As established, the 
committee consisted of several local officials and neighbors, 
including a member of a local group that promotes environmental 
awareness and smart growth.  While the committee had the 
municipality’s endorsement, meetings were not mandatory, nor 
were they to be considered in any way a substitute for the official 
decision-making process.  At one meeting, the golf partner of the 
developer answered questions from the committee, including 
queries as to impacts on water, traffic, open space access, and 
preservation of wildlife corridors.  The developer brought in a 
professional mediator for another session.  The committee met six 
times over the course of seven weeks.  The developer wrote 
summaries of each meeting and circulated them to the committee 
members with the agenda for the next meeting.  His firm paid for 
the site and building plans presented to the committee.  There 
was no opposition to the meetings and no one dropped out. 
Certain representatives from the town who attended the 
concept committee meetings indicated that they had some 
misgivings about the process.  One official remarked that by 
drafting minutes of the meetings, the developer retained control 
of the process and did not go far enough to get the committee’s 
approval of the minutes.  Another commented that the developer 
inflated the number of homes that were likely to be approved and 
felt that he manipulated the committee into agreeing to a larger 
development than it otherwise would have chosen.  One member 
felt that the committee participants should have been examined 
for conflicts of interest before being asked to join.  A town official 
who participated throughout the approval process and who favors 
collaborative approaches says the developer lost much hard won 
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credibility by waiting until the eleventh hour to disclose his 
decision to switch the golf course from public to private. 
Each of the neighbors would have preferred to see a smaller 
development on the parcel; one stated that there was “no solid 
feeling” that the end result was acceptable to all.  And while no 
one felt that the project or the committee process itself was forced 
upon them, they all believe that a neutral facilitator would have 
made for a fairer, more satisfactory process.  Notwithstanding 
their criticism, all considered the use of a concept committee 
beneficial, and all appreciated the opportunity to choose among 
alternative projects for the site. 
The developer said he formed a concept committee because 
he wanted consensus from the outset, which he believed would 
result in a better project.  Both he and his associate expressed 
enthusiasm for the project, asserting that it was “wonderfully 
well planned, addressed owners’ and environmentalists’ needs, 
and pretty much everyone was happy.”  The alternative, in their 
view, was a contentious approval process that would have taken 
years to complete with no guarantee of approval.  The developer 
sees involving the community as the way to address residents’ 
fears fueled by incorrect and misleading information and notes 
that a concept committee provides an additional forum to the 
required process for residents to speak about their concerns.  The 
concept committee’s involvement and approval made the required 
process run more smoothly. 
Despite the developer’s use of the concept committee for this 
project, he drew the community’s ire by switching from a public 
course to a private course after the committee had reached 
agreement.  The issue of residents’ use of the course was later 
resolved by allowing residents twenty-five rounds of golf six days 
per week and by providing access for two school golf teams.  The 
developer learned an important lesson: the committee’s work 
continues after an agreement is reached.  Openness must be 
maintained throughout the process—no matter how complicated 
or uncertain the issues are.  The developer sees no disadvantage 
to seeking community participation, but cautions that the process 
will work only if committee members participate voluntarily.  At 
the least, he says, using a collaborative approach will make for a 
shorter, more reasonable approval process. 
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A local conservation group had some concerns about the 
process and the result.  According to one interviewee, the 
environment is the one element often entirely left out of the 
process in land development.  This project was a prime example 
of a case in which the scientific perspective was neglected.  For 
example, no representative of this group was included in the 
concept committee; issues of biodiversity or wildlife were only 
brought out in the required process—at a point too far along to 
examine and resolve them properly.  And since the developer had 
already been involved with the concept committee, he was not 
open to considering important additional modifications after 
information was revealed in the required process.  While 
acknowledging the attraction of resolving land use problems in a 
non-adversarial manner, this person believes the fundamental 
problem with collaboration is that environmental considerations 
are brought up too late in the process for them to receive 
adequate attention.  Accordingly, the interviewee warns against 
using these committees as a cure-all to land development 
controversies. 
An official who was also involved in conservation and who 
was invited to view the site credits the developer with having an 
open mind.  According to the interviewee, he did make some 
modifications to the golf course in order to avoid sensitive 
resources, but remains extremely concerned with the adequacy of 
a fifty-foot buffer on a critical watercourse and the number of 
exceptions within the buffer.  According to the interviewee, the 
developer demonstrated a “real unwillingness” to consider design 
changes.  The interviewee was uncomfortable with the fact that 
the developer had the power to revert to his alternative proposal 
for ninety or more single-family homes, which had also undergone 
an environmental review.  Maintaining the concept committee 
through the required process, this person believes, may well have 
ensured a more thorough and satisfactory resolution of the water 
quality issues. 
One resident who lives near the site found the concept 
committee helpful in giving the townspeople an opportunity to 
evaluate the alternative development proposals and focus on the 
one or two that were most appropriate.  Finding out what people 
object to and are concerned about at the outset rather than in 
public meetings, this person feels, is the main advantage to such 
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committees.  This individual found the developer fair and 
balanced and did not feel that a facilitator would necessarily have 
improved the process.  Another resident on the concept committee 
would have preferred preservation to the development of the site 
and remains concerned about water quality.  Nevertheless, this 
person valued the use of a collaborative approach, noting that it 
allowed residents to know what was being planned, made them 
feel they were heard, and calmed some of their fears.  A neighbor 
agrees, and adds the opinion that the approving board should 
promote the intelligent use of concept committees; since that body 
is most often the starting point for a proposed project, it is in the 
best position to recommend their use. 
 C.  Rezoning for Senior Housing 
This project demonstrates how a collaborative approach used 
in tandem with the required process can result in a proposal 
welcomed by a large segment of the community.  Before this 
developer became involved, the fifty-one acre parcel was zoned for 
commercial use.  The developer initiated a process to rezone the 
parcel to allow for senior housing clustered on part of the 
property with significant open space. 
Faced with the hurdle of rezoning, the developer organized a 
consensus committee to identify interests and build support.  
Local officials were informed of the meetings and endorsed the 
process.  There were at least ten informal meetings of thirty-forty 
residents usually with the same nucleus of five to seven of the 
most interested citizens.  The developer served as the process 
manager by preparing the agenda and organizing presentations 
by architects, engineers, and other experts.  By the time approval 
was obtained, over one hundred meetings had been held. 
One official who attended dozens of meetings believed the 
collaborative effort worked so well because both the municipality 
and the developer were highly motivated.  The town gained 
desired housing with minimal disruption and received additional 
benefits of green space for the public, and also received much 
needed sewer connections.  In the end, the property was rezoned 
with little opposition.  By going to the community, the developer 
ended up with strong support during the required process and no 
unpleasant surprises.  He does not believe a facilitator would 
have improved the process based on his experience that a 
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purported neutral usually has a relationship with someone.  At 
least with the developer as process manager, he notes, the 
residents are aware of the bias.  His suggestions for others 
undertaking is a collaborative approach: talk to the residents 
early on and take them seriously, “you may discover the project 
isn’t palatable or needs to be curtailed.” 
A longtime resident whose home will become part of the new 
sewer district took an active role in meetings with the developer.  
The vast majority of residents supported the project, this person 
says, because it meant a residential development without 
burdening the school system.  The open and recreational space 
was an additional benefit; the interviewee believes the forty acres 
were offered to the community by the developer because they 
consist largely of undevelopable wetlands and steep slopes.  
Support was not unanimous, the interviewee admits.  At least one 
homeowner objected to the building height, and there have been 
accusations that those benefiting from the sewer deal are “selling 
out.”  Another opponent doesn’t like what the developer is 
building in another community and so will object to any project 
proposed by the developer.  One resident feels that the developer 
has been consistent throughout the process and willing to work 
with the community.  “People always think developers lie and 
cheat, but they’re just businessmen, trying to make money.” 
 D.  Senior Condominiums 
This project represents a successful mix of affordable housing 
for seniors that meets a current need, inter-municipal coop-
eration, and creative land preservation.  The developer originally 
proposed to build 112 senior apartments and forty attached 
single-family houses.  The number of units was decreased and the 
overall plan revised after a series of meetings with local 
residents.  The revised plan has more contiguous open space that 
is protected by a conservation easement and served by a trail 
system, public access to a pond area, and ten percent of the 
affordable senior housing to local residents. 
The developer began the project by holding several meetings 
with local officials.  Encouraged that he would be able to forge a 
consensus in support of his proposal, the developer acquired the 
site and then initiated several rounds of meetings with neighbors, 
both in groups and one-on-one.  Meetings were informal and 
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without ground rules, but provided an open forum for people to 
voice their opinions and concerns.  Residents’ reactions ultimately 
led to revision of the site plan to reduce building height and 
length for the senior facility by adding a third structure, moving 
single family homes away from neighboring properties, and 
creating more contiguous open space.  Parking was relocated to 
adjacent property through negotiations with the property’s 
owner, unnecessary emergency access eliminated, and a 
conservation easement placed on a portion of the site. 
One official who attended all of the meetings as an observer 
notes the favorable impression the developer made with many of 
the participants.  The meetings were well attended and were 
conducted where anyone who wished to speak could.  The 
principal issues brought up concerned the size of buffers and the 
emergency access road.  This individual says that the developer 
was able to mitigate nearly every problem.  The interviewee 
considers him a “good businessman [who] took people’s concerns 
seriously” and believes his approach saved a good deal of time 
and money, noting that he had a much easier time in obtaining 
the board’s approval because he worked with the members 
throughout the process.  He would like to see the collaborative 
techniques used more often.  For another official of the town, 
however, this project does not provide a particularly good 
example of consensus building.  One official is not aware that the 
municipality was brought into the process at all.  He feels that 
they had no say in where the entrance to the development would 
be located and no real options in the matter. 
A local environmental group was concerned about potential 
problems with storm water runoff, impacts on wetlands and 
wetland buffers, and compromising a portion of a reservoir.  Some 
residents had come to the group with similar concerns.  The 
environmental group found it easy to work with the developer.  
The developer repositioned homes to avoid encroaching on 
wetland buffers, reduced the length of driveways to decrease the 
amount of impervious surfaces, used porous pavement for 
driveways near buffers, added a water quality treatment basin, 
and made it pedestrian friendly.  Remarking on the development 
process generally, she said there needs to be a “wholesale change 
in the way planning is done.” 
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Another resident involved in conservation is a self-described 
“strict environmentalist” who expressed opposition to the project 
and who, early on in the process, made a sarcastic comment to 
the developer about the destruction of trees.  His participation in 
the process was mainly through one-on-one meetings with the 
developer.  At their initial meeting, the developer made promises 
concerning open space and water supply issues.  The resident 
admits to some skepticism but the developer kept his promises: 
“He reached out to [me] as if [I were] a stakeholder even when I 
had no control over the situation.”  The developer brought in 
hydrologists to allay his fears over the aquifer and water shortage 
problems, limited the number of trees cut, and created a walking 
trail.  Overall, this individual says, the process was “wonderful;”” 
he also felt that the “give and take” was possible because the 
developer was so willing to listen and try to remedy certain 
concerns.  This resident does not believe a facilitator was needed 
in this case, but appreciates that one would be advantageous if 
there are other people “as stubborn in their views” as this person 
was about what should be done. 
III. LAWYER AS ADVOCATE FOR COLLABORATIVE 
PROCESSES 
The concept committees used in the cases above show how 
the required process can be supplemented with collaborative 
techniques.  While lawyers play a central role in the selection of 
process, few are trained to design, manage and participate in 
collaborative processes.  If lawyers are not familiar with these 
processes they will be hesitant to participate or recommend them.  
For example, what would have resulted in the cases above had 
attorneys counseled against participating in the concept 
committees?  The following framework is designed to help 
lawyers provide valuable advice on collaborative processes and 
more broadly satisfy client needs. 
Most lawyers advise their clients to follow the required 
process and are skeptical, if not hostile, of processes that go 
beyond what is legally required.  When looking at how lawyers 
are trained, on one level, this makes sense.  Law schools teach 
students to provide advice on what is legal.  They are trained to 
tell clients what they must do.  The required process is law; 
clients must follow the law.  However, on another level, this 
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hostility does not square with the oath lawyers take to faithfully 
discharge their duties and adhere to rules of professional 
conduct.50
Lawyers may also hesitate to recommend collaborative 
processes fearing a diminished role as a substantive legal advisor.  
For many lawyers, this is an important point to make: advocating 
a supplementary process does not relegate the attorney to the 
sidelines.  Parties need competent legal advice to understand the 
range of outcomes and not exaggerate alternatives or omit 
relevant information.  Before agreeing to collaborate, and 
certainly before reaching an agreement, a party must know what 
they are likely to get in the required process.  For example, a 
developer needs to be aware of what she is entitled to as-of-right 
and what is discretionary.  Neighbors need to know the same 
thing.  Government officials need to know what authority they 
have to approve or deny a particular application and what 
information is needed to support a decision. 
  Collaborative processes, while not required, offer 
lawyers a mechanism to meet client needs and achieve better 
outcomes. 
An objective legal assessment is necessary to serve as a 
comparison to what is being negotiated in the collaborative 
process.  This may be one of the harder things for attorneys to do 
when faced with a significant development because rights are not 
always clearly defined—especially in situations where the 
government can make discretionary approvals and take 
legislative actions.  However, when done thoroughly and 
thoughtfully, a range of options comes into relief that can 
sufficiently inform the evaluation of any agreement reached.  
When done poorly, clients will have an inflated sense of 
entitlement that serves as a barrier to reaching agreement.  For 
those attorneys seeking to expand their effectiveness as process 
advocates, they need not give up their role as substantive 
advocates.  In fact, following the advice in the next section, can 
improve their overall effectiveness. 
The following subsections are organized to deal with issues 
as they might arise in the course of representing a client in a 
significant land development.  First, a lawyer must know when 
 
 50. Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney be Required to Advise a Client of 
ADR Options?, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 927 
(Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow et al. eds., 2005). 
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collaboration is appropriate and when the required process will 
work to meet a client’s needs.  Second, lawyers can help clients 
see the positive aspects of conflict.  Third, an awareness that 
different processes produce different results helps parties to 
recognize the consequences of process choices.  Fourth, 
collaboration is not a nebulous term; it has discrete and definite 
components.  Fifth, any agreement reached must be presented to 
the decision-making agency and is subject to the rigors of the 
required process.  Sixth, the subsequent required process must be 
monitored to ensure the final decision adequately incorporates 
the collaborative agreement. 
 A.  The Required Process Works Well, Most of the 
Time 
Supplementing the required process with collaborative 
approaches—such as a concept committee—is not appropriate for 
all development decisions.  In fact, it is probably not appropriate 
for the majority of development decisions.  This is because the 
required process works well most of the time.  It handles most 
land use decisions efficiently and effectively providing a 
predictable set of procedures and legal rules for applicants to 
follow when seeking governmental approval. 
Specifically, the required process works well for development 
decisions where the correct legal solution is obvious.  These are 
typically as-of-right decisions or ministerial decisions where the 
government does not have much discretion, the issues are few 
and uncomplicated, controversy is limited, the information 
needed is obvious, and there is little debate about the validity of 
the information.51
 
 51. See McAdoo & Bakken, supra note 5, at 183. 
  Examples might include an application for a 
single-family home, a minor addition and extension, a minor 
subdivision and site plan, a sign, and a variance.  In these 
situations, following the required process will not limit the 
outcomes available to the client because their needs can be met 
through application of the law.  If the government denies an 
application, that decision can be appealed and, if found to be 
incorrect, overturned.  The need for a collaborative process in 
these situations is minimized. 
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However, where the government has considerable decision-
making discretion, a challenge or appeal is likely, and the 
proposed development threatens considerable harm, the required 
process does not work well.52  Significant developments, like the 
ones featured in Part II, have these characteristics.  When clients 
are faced with multi-party, multi-issue situations where parties 
can benefit from sharing information, adhering to the required 
process is not likely to generate satisfying outcomes.  Helping 
clients understand the effect of different processes is an 
important role.53
 B.  Conflict Presents Opportunities 
 
Many people take a negative view of conflict.54  Many work 
hard to avoid it and then, once embroiled, chart the quickest 
course out of it.55  Significant development conflicts are no 
different.  Neighbors, developers, and politicians will go to great 
lengths to minimize conflicts and contain their effects.  Once 
embroiled in a controversy, parties rarely see past their 
differences and their interactions take on a combative and 
competitive tone.56  They view each other as the archetypal foe: 
developers as rapacious, greedy and deceitful, officials as 
incompetent, corrupt and unresponsive and opponents as 
parochial, hypocritical and untrustworthy.57  The overwhelming 
sense is that there is no common ground and the only option is to 
prepare for battle and hope for a quick victory by defeating the 
other side.58
 
 52. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A 
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and 
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 274 (2005); 
John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land 
Law Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). 
 
 53. See Breger, supra note 50 (discussing how some states’ code of conduct 
mandates that attorneys discuss the appropriate dispute resolution options with 
a client). 
 54. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 19. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 17; MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE 
AND DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 7 (1973). 
 57. See DOUGLAS PORTER, BREAKING THE DEVELOPMENT LOG JAM: NEW 
STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING COMMUNITY SUPPORT (2006). 
 58. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 4-17. 
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While pervasive, this negative perception presents an 
incomplete vision of conflict.  Mary Parker Follet, a labor 
management expert from the 1920s, observed that, “all polishing 
occurs through friction”59 and according to Albert Einstein, “[i]n 
the middle of difficulty lies opportunity.”60
In the Rezoning for Senior Housing case above, the property 
was zoned for commercial use but the community needed senior 
housing, open space, and sewer connections.
  While the perception 
of significant land developments is principally negative, these 
decisions usually present many rich opportunities to mine mutual 
gains.  Finding a way to realize these benefits while still guarding 
against the dangers is an exciting role for lawyers who recognize 
the value of process advocacy. 
61  Many of the 
houses around the parcel had failing septic systems that were 
polluting the local drinking water supply.  By adding the sewer 
system, the developer saved the community money and time.  In 
return, the developer got a discretionary rezoning, predictability 
in the decision-making process, and buy-in from the municipality 
and the residents.  If the developer had pursued an as-of-right 
development under the commercial zoning, he would have had a 
much harder time winning approval, if at all.62
 
 59. MARY PARKER FOLLETT, DYNAMIC ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLECTED PAPERS 
OF MARY PARKER FOLLETT 31 (Henry C. Metcalf & L. Urwick eds., Harper & 
Brothers Publishers 1940) (1926). 
  By exploiting 
different priorities, the developer provided high value benefits to 
the community at a low cost to him.  For example, the developer 
did not care about what would be built; but rather, what he 
wanted was a return on his investment.  Whether it was a mall or 
senior housing did not matter to him; however, it mattered to the 
community.  On the other hand, the community wanted some 
benefits out of the project but it did not care how long it took to 
make a decision, but for the developer, time was money.  A long 
delay in the approval process due to citizen opposition and legal 
appeals would be very costly.  By searching for and finding these 
trades the parties were able to manage the conflict to minimize 
dangers and maximize opportunities. 
 60. QuoteWorld.org, http://www.quoteworld.org/quotes/4122 (last visited Dec. 
15, 2009). 
 61. See supra Part II.C. 
 62. NOLON & BECK, supra note 49.  
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For value to be created in land use conflicts, lawyers should 
help parties identify opportunities while protecting them against 
the dangers.  Lawyers involved in significant developments have 
the opportunity to shape their client’s view of the situation.  If 
they feed into a client’s negative view of conflict and promise a 
quick resolution in an attempt to minimize danger, they will miss 
opportunities to discover and explore differences that can lead to 
creative outcomes.  In Beyond Winning, the authors remind us 
that “[d]ifferences are often more useful than similarities in 
helping parties reach a deal [as] . . . [d]ifferences set the stage for 
possible gains from a trade and it is through trades that value is 
most commonly created.”63
 C.  Different Processes Produce Different Results 
 
At stake in this choice of process is the type of outcomes that 
are possible.  The required process conducted as an adversarial 
adjudication will produce narrow outcomes.64  When parties 
engage in adversarial processes, they become highly 
competitive.65  Their interactions become less about solving the 
problem and more about undermining the other party.66  This 
shift away from problem solving is what reduces creativity.  
There are many reasons why competitive, adversarial processes 
discourage creativity.67  The limited scope of the required process 
inhibits the imagination of the parties.68
 
 63. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND 
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 14 (2000). 
  The trial-like climate 
forces attorneys and parties to think in oppositional and polarized 
 64. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in THE PRINCIPLES 
OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth I. Wilson ed., 
rev. ed. 2001) (making the point that adjudicative decisions demand a level of 
rationality that is not expected of negotiated agreements). 
 65. DOUGLAS YARN, DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 10 (1999). 
 66. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 17; see also DEUTSCH, supra 
note 56, at 7. 
 67. See DEUTSCH, supra note 56; see also KENNETH E. BOULDING, CONFLICT 
AND DEFENSE: A GENERAL THEORY (1962); LOUIS KRIESBERG, THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
SOCIAL CONFLICT (1973). 
 68. DEUTSCH, supra note 56, at 30 (noting that “[a] competitive process 
stimulates the view that the solution of a conflict can only be one that is 
imposed by one side on the other.”). 
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frames instead of taking an expansive view of the situation.69  It 
leads parties to guard information and preferences closely for fear 
of giving up some advantage.70  It encourages the manipulation of 
information to enhance one’s position and to erode or discredit the 
other party’s.71  Overall these tactics promote fear and mistrust 
among the parties72 that then drives parties to more competitive 
interactions.73  Once relations turn hostile, the likelihood of 
seizing opportunities is greatly reduced and the range of possible 
outcomes is further narrowed.74
Lawyers play an important role in setting parties’ 
expectations about how to interact with each other in the 
development approval process.  While it is impossible to 
generalize about all lawyers, it is fair to say that the legal 
profession encourages a competitive and oppositional approach to 
conflict.
 
75
 
 69. Id. at 29 (noting that “[a] competitive process tends to increase sensitivity 
to differences and threats while minimizing the awareness of similarities. It 
stimulates the sense of complete oppositeness.”); see also Robert M. Ackerman, 
Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 30 (2002) (observing that “[r]egrettably, systems of 
conflict resolution can also serve as barriers to community building. The 
procedural nuances of litigation and arbitration can be manipulated to stifle 
meaningful discourse among the disputants.”). 
  Lawyers typically assume that “(1) the disputants are 
 70. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM L. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 1991) (1981); 
ROGER AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
 71. DEUTSCH, supra note 56, at 29.  
A competitive process is characterized by either lack of communication or 
misleading communication. It also gives rise to espionage or other 
techniques of obtaining information about the other that the other is 
unwilling to communicate. In addition to obtaining such information, 
each part is interested in providing discouraging or misleading 
information to the other.  
Id. 
 72. Id. (indicating that “[i]t seems likely that competition produces a stronger 
bias toward misperceiving the other’s neutrality or conciliatory actions as 
malevolently motivated”). 
 73. Id. at 217; see also Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive 
Bargaining, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 325 (1996). 
 74. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K, SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: 
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 34-35 (1986); see AXELROD, 
supra note 70. 
 75. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical 
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 
1337 (1997). 
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adversaries—i.e., if one wins, the other must lose—and (2) that 
disputes may be resolved through application, by a third party, of 
some general rule of law.”76  This adversarial approach may be 
useful in situations where parties are negotiating to distribute a 
fixed resource, there is overlap in the bargaining range, and 
where future relationships are not important.77  In these 
situations, an adversarial approach efficiently distributes the 
resource among the parties.78
In significant developments, however, parties are not dealing 
with a fixed resource that can only be divided up into finite 
pieces.  While the land being debated is a fixed resource, what 
can be done on the land and how deliberations proceed offers 
many opportunities.  A predominantly adversarial approach will 
undermine the relationships needed to uncover any opportunities 
that might be present.  Since significant developments frequently 
require discretionary approvals, governments can create value or 
expand the pie by granting new rights.  For example, in the 
Rezoning from Single Family to Townhouses case study, the 
government rezoned the parcel to change the allowed use from 
single family to attached housing and a golf course.  A fixed 
resource perspective, relying on a competitive process and 
undermining relationships, would have inhibited the exploration 
of opportunities. 
 
 
 76. These assumptions appear on what has been called “the lawyer’s 
standard philosophical map.” Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 29, 43-44 (1982); see also Leonard L. Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: 
On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, 
Lawyers, and Their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 n. 54 (2002) 
(recognizing that the map is overdrawn and does not represent the mindset of 
most transactional lawyers, but that it does describe “the way most lawyers 
think, most of the time” citing Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, supra at 46). 
 77. For example, when negotiating to buy a house the seller wants the 
highest price possible and the buyer wants the lowest. What they are 
negotiating over is a fixed resource—the seller only has one house and the buyer 
only has so much money. The higher the price, the less money the buyer has left 
over. 
 78. FISHER & URY, supra note 70, at 151-53 (pointing out that there are few 
situations that are truly zero sum/fix pie; for example, maybe the seller needs to 
sell quickly, or the buyer is having a hard time getting a mortgage—there are 
creative solutions that could help the parties allocate resources and meet 
interests). 
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Collaborative approaches can more effectively help clients 
meet the full range of needs79 and explore possibilities for mutual 
gain.80
A collaborative process can also help overcome significant 
psychological barriers to creating value and reaching 
agreement.
  The community may need senior housing, childcare 
facilities, infrastructure repairs, playing fields, or open space.  
These are important interests that are often not protected or 
advanced by the existing land use regulations.  Having 
cooperation as an essential element allows the parties to move 
beyond the win-lose dynamic and explore interests beyond just 
what is legal. 
81  Through the competitive dynamic of an adversarial 
process parties look unfavorably on solutions proposed by the 
other side simply because they are proposed by the other side.82  
In processes like the required process, that set parties against 
each other, this reactive devaluation prevents parties from 
looking at the situation creatively.83
 
 79. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem 
Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT L. REV. 97, 109 
(2001) (including psychological, economic, social, political, and moral needs). 
  Instead of seeing the value 
 80. These solutions can be referred to as “win-win,” however, this framing 
inappropriately elevates expectations so parties think they will get everything 
they want instead of satisfying their interests. 
 81. CONSENSUS BUILDING INSTITUTE, COGNITIVE BARRIERS IN THE LAND USE 
PLANNING PROCESS 4 (2007), http://cbuilding.org/resource/cognitive-barriers-
land-use-planning-process (click to download pdf). 
 82. Robert Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the 
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 247 (1993); Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in 
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 54 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995); 
DEUTSCH, supra note 56, at 30 (indicating that “[a] competitive process leads to a 
suspicious, hostile attitude, and it increases the readiness to exploit the other’s 
needs and respond negatively to the other’s requests.”). 
 83. Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in 
BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 38 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).  
[Reactive devaluation increases] the likelihood that compromise 
proposals or concessions designed to demonstrate goodwill and prompt 
reciprocation will fail in their objectives. All too often, they will be 
dismissed as trivial and token, or received with coolness and expressions 
of distrust that serve to thwart the goal of negotiated agreement and to 
weaken rather than strengthen the hand of those who urge conciliation.  
Id. See also CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 21-22 (“[W]hen parties 
choose to enter the legal system, it becomes more difficult for them to exchange 
information and adjust their positions. As a result, satisfactory solutions may be 
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of the proposal, the parties are blinded by biases and 
stereotypes.84  Attorneys can reduce the effect of this devaluation 
by guiding clients to a process where creative ideas are not 
presented in the adversarial context.85
In significant development decisions, where multiple parties 
are involved and multiple issues are being discussed, lawyers 
should help parties move from an exclusively adversarial 
approach to a process with collaborative elements.  Adversarial 
approaches start with solutions and emphasize competition 
among the parties over how to distribute the available 
resources.
  Concept committees are 
just one example of a process that reduces the effects of reactive 
devaluation. 
86  Collaborative approaches start with gathering 
information and emphasize communication that explores possible 
solutions.87  An effective collaborative process also recognizes and 
plans for the distribution of resources after value is created.88  
This means that there will be some competitive interactions in a 
collaborative process, but those moments are managed so as to 
not interfere with the creation of value.89
 
overlooked, and resources that could otherwise be developed to finding creative 
solutions are poured into carrying on a fight.”). 
  The attorney who does 
not counsel a client to explore collaborative options loses the 
opportunity to create value and will have less to distribute. 
 84. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 21-22. 
 85. MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 63, at 95-96 (stating that 
lawyers should use problem-solving methods in both disputes and deals to 
create value that would otherwise be unavailable to the client); CHRISTOPHER W. 
MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING 
CONFLICT 272 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing how “[p]arties often adhere to positions 
because they see no other way to develop new ones. Introducing a logical or 
acceptable problem-solving process can often allow a disputant to abandon a 
position in favor of another option.”). 
 86. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 756-57 (1984) (discussing 
how “in the adversarial approach to negotiation] resources are limited and must 
be divided. Information about one’s real preferences must be jealously 
guarded.”). 
 87. See infra Part III.D. 
 88. MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 63, at 40 (“No matter how 
good you are at brainstorming and no matter how carefully you search out 
value-creation trades, at some point the pie has to be sliced.”). 
 89. WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING 
DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 9 
(1988). 
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 D.  Collaboration Has Required Elements 
What does “collaboration” mean to the average lawyer?  For 
some, it may suggest a cooperative process where all the parties 
set aside their differences and reach an agreement that 
maximizes the common good.  Other lawyers may see a group of 
people giving away value that they are entitled to, being taken 
advantage of, and subverting the safeguards in the required 
process.90
The popular view that collaborative processes are nebulous 
and loosely organized, squarely conflicts with what is practiced by 
professionals
  Whichever image a lawyer subscribes to, the reality is 
that few have an accurate understanding of what collaboration is. 
91 and promoted by scholars.92  Over the last forty 
years, a range of collaborative techniques has successfully been 
applied to public policy disputes dealing with environmental and 
land use matters.93
In the public policy context much has been written on 
collaboration.
  Through this scholarship and body of 
practice, a firm concept of collaboration has emerged that is well 
organized, detailed, and specific. 
94
 
 90. GRAY, supra note 3, at 250-51. 
  Much of this work starts with the understanding 
 91. Including a variety of professional associations ranging from the 
International Association of Public Participation, National Coalition for Dialog 
and Deliberation, to the Association for Conflict Resolution and American Bar 
Association’s Dispute Resolution Section. 
 92. See CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40; GRAY, supra note 3; Lon 
Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971); 
FISHER & URY, supra note 70; HOWARD RAIFFA, JOHN RICHARDSON & DAVID 
METCALFE, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF COLLABORATIVE 
DECISION MAKING 311-27 (2002); Carrie Menkel-Meadows, The Lawyer’s Role(s) 
in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347 (2005); Lawrence Susskind, 
Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 
(1981); John P. McCrory, Environmental Mediation—Another Piece for the 
Puzzle, 6 VT. L. REV. 49 (1981); Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of 
Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981). 
 93. See GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF 
EXPERIENCE (1986); WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 3; LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, 
SARAH MCKEARNAN & JENNIFER THOMAS-LARMER, CONSENSUS BUILDING 
HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (1999); GRAY, 
supra note 3; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40; John Forester & David 
Stitzel, Beyond Neutrality: The Possibilities of Activist Mediation in Public 
Sector Conflicts, NEGOT. J., July 1989, at 251; MANAGING LAND-USE CONFLICTS: 
CASE STUDIES IN SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT (David J. Brower & Daniel S. Carol 
eds., 1987). 
 94. See supra note 92. 
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that collaboration is defined as being both assertive and 
cooperative.95
Collaborating involves an attempt to work with others to 
find some solution that fully satisfies their concerns.  It 
means digging into an issue to pinpoint the underlying 
needs and wants of the two individuals.  Collaborating 
between two persons might take the form of exploring a 
disagreement to learn from each other’s insights or trying 
to find a creative solution to an interpersonal problem.
  Kenneth Thomas and Ralph Kilmann assert that: 
96
Barbara Gray, in Collaborating, applies this notion to public 
policy situations and provides the following commentary: 
 
Five features [of collaboration] are critical to the process: (1) 
the stakeholders are interdependent, (2) solutions emerge by 
dealing constructively with differences, (3) joint ownership of 
decisions is involved, (4) stakeholders assume collective 
responsibility for the future direction of the domain and (5) 
collaboration is an emergent property.97
To help organize this advice into an accessible framework for 
lawyers in significant development decisions, a collaborative 
process must be inclusive, transparent and responsive.  Without 
these elements, a process labeled “collaborative” will not deliver 
on its potential.  While other frameworks are available to describe 
the elements of a collaborative process in the public policy 
context,
 
98
 
 95. See Ralph Kilmann, http://www.kilmann.com/conflict.html (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2009). 
 inclusive, transparent and responsive presents an 
 96. Id. 
 97. GRAY, supra note 3, at 11. 
 98. For a detailed and comprehensive overview of consensus building see 
SUSSKIND, MCKEARNAN & THOMAS-LARMER, supra note 93; see also CARPENTER & 
KENNEDY, supra note 40; JIM ARTHUR, CHRIS CARLSON & LEE MOORE, A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONSENSUS (1999); Ass’n for Conflict Resolution, Best 
Practices for Government Agencies: Guidelines for Using Collaborative 
Agreement Seeking Processes, http://www.acrnet.org/acrlibrary/more.php?id= 
13_0_1_0_M (last visited Dec. 19, 2009); STEVEN DANIELS & GREGG WALKER, 
WORKING THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT: THE COLLABORATIVE LEARNING 
APPROACH (2001); GRAY, supra note 3. For a thorough description of meditative 
processes that require collaboration, see MOORE, supra note 85; WONDOLLECK, & 
YAFFEE, supra note 3; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING (Thomas 
Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2008); SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S 
RULES, supra note 3. 
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accessible model for lawyers involved in development decisions.  
Attorneys using these three elements can quickly assess whether 
a particular process is on track or needs to be adjusted to better 
meet client needs. 
 
*  *  * 
A Note on the Process Manager 
One way to ensure that these three elements are present is to 
designate a process manager who has the requisite skill and 
access to adequate resources.  In most public policy situations, 
this function is often ignored.  Ideally, the process manager 
should be a neutral party—one without a stake in the outcome.  
At the local level, however, where suspicion runs high and 
resources are limited, most groups decide not to hire a neutral.99  
If a group decides to collaborate without hiring a neutral process 
manager they must designate one or more parties to serve as the 
process manager.  Ideally, the designated party will have some 
experience in group dynamics and collaboration.100
The concept committee cases in Part II illustrate how an 
interested party can assume the role of process manager.  In 
some of those cases, the participants felt that the process 
manager should have been a neutral.
  The party 
should work with the other parties to break out of the adversarial 
dynamic, avoid typical traps that waste time and money, so the 
party can all create value and claim as much as possible. 
101  In others, parties were 
content with a stakeholder managing the process.102
 
 99. This is assuming that they are even aware of what a neutral could do to 
assist and improve outcomes. 
  Regardless 
of the perception, the use of an interested party as a process 
 100. In Breaking Robert’s Rules, the parties have the benefit of a community 
member, Connie, who has had some experience with facilitation and group 
processes. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 3, at 
44. Susskind lays out an excellent and comprehensive structure for a 
collaborative process, called the Consensus Building Approach that relies 
heavily on the guidance and encouragement from Connie. Id. This is an ideal 
situation—someone from the community who has the experience and 
background to guide the process and also has the free time to serve the group. 
Id.     
 101. See supra Part II.D. 
 102. See supra Part II.A, II.C and II.D. 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/5
S_NOLON  
2009-10] THE LAWYER AS PROCESS ADVOCATE 137 
manager presents a potential for abuse that must be guarded 
against.  Since collaboration is, at its core, an ad hoc process, the 
ever-present temptation to tip the scales in one’s favor can 
corrupt the intentions of an “interested” process manager.  While 
experience is useful and a neutral is preferred, the fact remains 
that despite decades of support for these ideas,103
While there is a persistent debate about the neutrality of the 
process manager,
 use of neutral 
mediators at a local level is the exception rather than the rule.  
Lawyers and parties educated and practiced in principles of 
collaborative process can help protect against abuses and 
advocate for good process in the absence of a skilled neutral. 
104
 
 there is little debate about the importance of 
having a process manager.  In all the case studies in Part II, the 
parties valued the role of the process manager and recognized the 
utility to have someone play that role.  For attorneys advising 
clients in local land use matters, advocating for a process 
manager—ideally as neutral as possible—is a necessity.  If hiring 
a neutral is not feasible and an interested party manages the 
process, then attorney and client must guard vigilantly against 
abuses of process. 
*  *  * 
1.  Inclusive 
To be inclusive, a process must include the right people at the 
right time and also include the right ideas.  A principal 
frustration with the required process is that the public is not 
required to participate until the public hearing, which is often at 
the end of the process.105
 
 103. See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, MIEKE VAN DER WANSEM & ARMAND CICCARELLI, 
MEDIATING LAND USE DISPUTES: PROS AND CONS (2000); THE WILLIAM & FLORA 
HEWLETT FOUND., ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: STRATEGIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL GRANTMAKERS (Rosemary O’Leary, Terry Amsler & Malka 
Kopell eds., 2005). 
  By this point, much of the work has 
been done by the applicant and the municipality to shape and 
 104. Forester & Stitzel, supra note 93 (looking at the role of activist mediators 
in public sector conflicts). 
 105. See SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE, supra note 4. 
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condition the proposal.106  As a result, public involvement is often 
characterized by hostile participation and rarely produces much 
value.107  While this hostility is directed at the substance of the 
application, much of the frustration is also with the process 
itself.108  In some communities months may pass before the 
public is officially asked to comment on an application.109
In addition to finding and selecting the appropriate 
participants, an inclusive process will emphasize building 
relationships among the parties.
  A 
collaborative process can minimize this frustration by including 
the right people early and including the right issues. 
110  In order to reach an 
agreement, parties must communicate with each other.  In order 
to communicate, parties must have a relationship.111  Many 
process managers have helped parties break through protracted 
stalemates by creating opportunities for new relationships to 
form.112
 
 106. MIKE E. MILES ET AL., REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND 
PROCESS 7 (4th ed. 2007) (presenting a model with “construction” as stage six, 
“obtaining government approval” is close to the end, at stage four). 
  In the successful Northern Ireland peace negotiations, 
the mediator created space for the parties to see each other in a 
 107. HERBERT INHABER, SLAYING THE NIMBY DRAGON 90 (1988).  
[R]esidents of Heard County took up arms to keep hazardous waste out 
of their community . . . a public hearing where a gun-toting crowd 
crammed into the local high school auditorium to parry and jeer at . . . 
officials of the state . . .  steel drums marked with skull and crossbones 
hurled from passing trucks; a rally and cross-burning by the Ku Klux 
Klan; a family grocery store selling “Dump the Dump” T-shirts; and most 
of all the violence—firebombing, arson, bullet-riddled pickup trucks.  
Id.; see also Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of 
Environmental Decisions: Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through 
Partnerships with Experts and Agents, 27 PACE ENVT. L. REV. 151, 207 (2009).  
 108. PORTER, supra note 57, at 3 (discussing how “[c]ommunity residents are 
given their only opportunity to speak about the issues at the scheduled public 
hearings, which can amount to a lame exercise in participatory democracy, the 
requisite public involvement that many citizens have come to view as a 
charade.”). 
 109. See Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System, supra 
note 9, at 602. 
 110. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 57-58; E. FRANKLIN DUKES, 
MARINA A. PISCOLISH & JOHN B. STEPHENS, REACHING FOR HIGHER GROUND IN 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: TOOLS FOR POWERFUL GROUPS AND COMMUNITIES (2000). 
 111. Id. 
 112. MAKING SENSE OF INTRACTABLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS: CONCEPTS 
AND CASES (Roy J. Lewicki, Barbara Gray & Michael Elliot eds., 2003). 
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different light by talking about their families and other interests 
like opera.113
The commitment to be inclusive must start early.
  From those relationships, the parties were able to 
communicate in a more reliable and productive way to establish 
trust, and were eventually able to reach an agreement ending 
years of bloody conflict.  Local land use disputes, with parties 
from the same community, who have overlapping interests and 
activities, present rich opportunities to similarly build 
relationships and create value.  In all of the case studies in Part 
II, interviews revealed that the process improved relationships 
among the participants. 
114  A 
process is not inclusive if it begins with the developer or 
municipality presenting a well-polished proposal that was created 
after months of internal preparation.  To be inclusive, parties 
must be involved long before an application is submitted or even 
ready to be submitted.115  Starting early allows for the greatest 
flexibility in reaching an agreement.116  Early in the process 
parties have not committed to and invested in particular 
solutions; their positions have not hardened thus creating a 
greater range of opportunities to meet parties’ interests.117  There 
are however, significant barriers to starting the process early.  
Parties often have inflated views of likely outcomes.118
 
 113. GEORGE MITCHELL, MAKING PEACE (1999). 
  A 
developer may view her application as likely to be approved while 
opponents may earnestly hold the opposite view.  In addition, a 
local official may look at the situation as it evolves and feel 
confident that he can manage any conflict that might result in a 
 114. “Early” usually means before an application has been submitted so that 
resources are not committed to a particular proposal that can limit flexibility 
later on.  Some scholars refer to this as “upstream.” See THE WILLIAM & FLORA 
HEWLETT FOUND., supra note 103; THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Rosemary O’Leary & Lisa B. Bingham 
eds., 2003); Lisa B. Bingham, Collaborative Governance: Emerging Practices and 
the Incomplete Legal Framework for Citizen and Stakeholder Voice, 1 HASTINGS 
ANN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
115. Sean Nolon, Moving Collaboration Upstream, ACRESOLUTION, Summer 
2007, at 26. 
 116. Id. 
 117. McAdoo & Bakken, supra note 6; Edith Netter, Using Mediation to 
Resolve Land Use Disputes, 15 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 25 (1992); Edith Netter, 
Using Mediation to Supplement Zoning Hearings, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 
(1992). 
 118. CONSENSUS BUILDING INSTITUTE, supra note 81. 
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manner that will satisfy all who are involved.  Research and 
findings in neuroscience, cognitive psychology and related fields 
have given us a greater understanding of these barriers.119
A less significant, but still important obstacle is the need for 
information gathering.  Under the structure of the required 
process, a developer will create a proposal based on his 
assessment of the relevant laws and the constraints of the 
property.
  In 
many cases, this overconfidence is reinforced by comments from 
attorneys who, in assessing likely outcomes, tend to emphasize 
the positive and omit the negative aspects of a case. 
120  A tremendous amount of money will be spent to pay 
for lawyers, planners, engineers, and scientists to help create that 
proposal.121  Under the structure of a collaborative process, the 
developer can show the parties a basic, inexpensive development 
plan allowed under the existing law and then ask them if that is 
what they want to see.  If not, the developer can dedicate the 
funds he would have spent on a full proposal, to engage in joint 
fact finding and gather information about development 
opportunities and environmental constraints.122  This is similar 
to what the developer did in the Rezoning from Single Family to 
Townhouses case study.123
Finally, the process must be framed broadly.  While including 
the right people is the hallmark of any collaborative process, the 
 
 
 119. While it is impracticable to generalize across the great variety of 
development disputes, this research gives us a small window into the 
motivations of some parties: the endowment effect, the status quo bias, 
overconfidence, self serving bias. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & 
Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Test of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Russell B. Korobkin, Inertia and 
Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules 
and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998) (discussing status quo bias); 
George Lowenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, Self 
Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 
(1993) (discussing self-serving bias). 
 120. See MILES  ET. AL, supra note 106, at 481-83. 
 121. Id. 
 122. PETER ADLER ET AL., MANAGING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL CASES: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR MEDIATORS AND 
FACILITATORS (2000), http://www.resolv.org/publications/reports/Environmental_ 
Cases.pdf; Norman Shultz, Joint Fact Finding, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY.ORG, 
July 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/joint_fact-finding/. 
 123. See supra Part II.B. 
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approach must also be inclusive of ideas.124  By framing the 
initiative broadly, a process can include the full range of topics 
that are important to the parties.  Critics of collaboration argue 
that a broad scope makes reaching agreement harder.125  The 
more issues there are on the table—the more out of control the 
process will become, the more expensive it will be and the less 
focused the negotiation will be.126  This criticism ignores the 
reality that most significant development proposals going 
through the required process have to address an oppressive 
number of issues in their formal review regardless of whether 
they are significant issues.127  As a result, the issues are only 
dealt with in a perfunctory manner, to meet the procedural 
requirements, but not to address the issues.128
2.  Transparent 
  A collaborative 
process identifies the truly relevant issues that actually need to 
be addressed and creates a productive structure to mitigate their 
impact.  As a result, the collaborative process can create more 
opportunity for creative problem solving. 
A transparent process allows people to peer in and see what 
is happening, what has happened, and what will be happening.  
Transparency requires information to be published widely and 
 
 124. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 54-55 (making the point that 
the problems identified initially are often not the real problems at issue 
requiring openness to new information). 
 125. See E. FRANKLIN DUKES & KAREN FIREHOCK, UNIV. OF VA.’S INST. FOR 
ENVTL. NEGOTIATION, COLLABORATION: A GUIDE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
ADVOCATES 69 (Michael Leahy & Mike Anderson, eds., 2001); Douglas S. 
Kenney, Are Community-Based Watershed Groups Really Effective?, 3 CHRON. 
CMTY. 33 (1999); DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, NATURAL RES. LAW CTR., UNIV. OF 
COLO. SCH. OF LAW, ARGUING ABOUT CONSENSUS: EXAMINING THE CASE 
AGAINST WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE 
GROUPS IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000), http://www.cde.state.co. 
us/artemis/ucb6/UCB6582C762000INTERNET.pdf; George Cameron Coggins, 
Of Californicators, Quislings, and Crazies: Some Perils of Devolved 
Collaboration, 2 CHRON. CMTY. 27 (1988); Michael McCloskey, The Skeptic: 
Collaboration Has Its Limits, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 13, 1996. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Struever Fidelco Cappelli, A Bold New Future for Yonkers, 
http://www.sfcyonkers.com/feis/index.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2009). 
 128. Michael Gerrard & Michael Herz, Harnessing Information Technology to 
Improve the Environmental Impact Review Process, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 18, 
22-23 (2003). 
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through many channels, so that as many people as possible know 
about it.  Transparency addresses another major frustration with 
the required process—that it does not adequately inform 
interested citizens what is happening in the decision-making 
process. 
The minimum notice requirements are mandatory statutory 
obligations.129  For example, in New York, the public hearing for 
a site plan application must be held within sixty-two days of 
receiving the application.130  Depending on the jurisdiction, notice 
might be a certified letter to adjacent property owners, it might 
be to all property owners within 500 feet, or it might require 
posting of the notice on the subject property.131  Once the 
application is accepted, the board will need to notice all public 
hearings and workshops and include the matter on the 
agendas.132  While notice provisions may meet basic due process 
rights, they do little to satisfy interested parties who would like 
to be involved.  In many situations, notice is so vague that 
recipients may wonder what a board will be discussing.  
Typically, there is little information on the agenda to indicate the 
sequence of events at a meeting.  Items may be placed on the 
agenda in the order in which they were requested rather than in 
terms of priority.133  Many people may be in attendance who will 
have to wait through ministerial matters until late in the evening 
for the matter with which they are concerned to be heard.134
Collaborative processes aspire to a level of satisfaction 
beyond what is required by due process.
  This 
breeds frustration and anger, and gives the impression that the 
board is not interested in input from the community. 
135
 
 129. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 276(8) (McKinney 2009). 
  Because collaborative 
processes are used to satisfy requirements beyond due process, 
 130. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a (8) (McKinney 2009). 
 131. See, e.g., CODE OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, N.Y., ch. 43, art. IX, §§ 43-99. 
 132. See, e.g., The Open Meetings Law, N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW, art. 7, § 104 
(McKinney 2009). 
 133. Interview with Dr. Michael Klemens, Rye, N.Y. (Sept. 2000). There are 
certainly exceptions to this practice. Boards will adjust their agenda to move 
priority items earlier in the evening if a large contingent of citizens is in 
attendance. Of course, there are plenty of boards that schedule controversial 
matters for later in the night, as well. 
 134. Id. 
 135. For a description of what due process requires, see JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE 
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). 
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they should be constructed as if they are on display, available for 
viewing by both the casual observers and involved parties.  Again, 
the ultimate goal in transparency is to allow anyone who is 
interested (participant or not) to be able to look into the process 
and see what has happened, what is happening, and where the 
process is going.136  Posting meeting notes, agendas, and 
schedules on websites can accomplish this effectively; however, 
depending on the community and the situation, a more engaged 
method of outreach may be necessary.137
The concept of transparency may make some attorneys 
uncomfortable because of a perceived strategic disadvantage for 
some clients.  Providing the wrong information at the wrong time 
may prejudice the outcome.  Being transparent, however, does not 
mean that all the information is discoverable; that would be both 
impractical and unwise.  Transparency refers to information 
about the process—when meetings will be held, what will be 
discussed, who will be there—as well as information shared in 
the process.  While this might be obvious to some, there is a 
danger that parties misunderstand what happens in a 
collaborative process.  While a collaborative process has elements 
of cooperation, it also has assertive elements.
 
138  Assertiveness 
compels parties to be truthful and honest about the power they 
posses, the rights they have and what interests they want to see 
met.139
3.  Responsive 
  Being assertive also requires a party to be strategic about 
what information they give out and when.  Therefore, being 
transparent refers to what is happening in meetings and at the 
“table,” but does not extend to the information parties decide not 
to share. 
Meeting this third element is the most challenging.  The 
essence of responsiveness is that the parties are ultimately in 
control of the process and the outcome.  Practically, being 
 
 136. David Strauss, Designing a Consensus Building Process Using a Graphic 
Road Map, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
REACHING AGREEMENT 137 (Larry Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (providing an 
excellent example of process mapping). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Ralph Kilmann, supra note 95. 
 139. Id. 
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responsive means that the process adjusts to new information 
and anticipates the next steps.  Meeting this element requires 
constant attention from a skilled and patient process manager. 
One of the flaws of the required process is that it is 
inflexible.140  It requires a large amount of information to be 
collected and organized during the very early stages.141  In 
significant development decisions, preparing an application can 
be very expensive.142  Applicants spend hundreds of thousands of 
dollars gathering information, hiring experts, reviewing the 
applicable law, and drafting maps for the application prior to 
submission.143
Lawyers favor the required process because they perceive it 
as predictable.  Specifically enforceable time frames give this 
impression; however, when dealing with significant decisions, the 
promise of predictability is an illusion.  Collaboration, on the 
other hand, is perceived as unpredictable because the governing 
guidelines are not codified or standardized ahead of time.  Many 
lawyers may be hesitant to trade the perceived predictability of 
the required process for what looks like an ad hoc approach.  The 
responsive nature of collaboration feeds this fear.  How can a 
process be predictable if it changes in response to new 
information?  How do we know what to expect? 
  Making this investment places significant inertia 
behind the application, making a developer reluctant to consider 
alterations.  An early collaborative process, such as a concept 
committee, helps applicants consider valuable alternatives before 
large amounts of money are spent and parties commit to their 
positions. 
While the required process may be predictable with as-of-
right and ministerial decisions, the approval process for 
significant development decisions can be predictably 
unpredictable.  Boards can delay their decision-making process if 
matters become too complicated or controversial.  Laws can be 
 
 140. See Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1966); City of 
Searcy v. Roberson, 273 S.W.2d 26 (Ark. 1954); but see In re Merson v. McNally, 
688 N.E.2d 479  (N.Y. 1997). 
 141. See MILES ET AL., supra note 106. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
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changed or subject to different interpretations.144  Appeals can 
add delay and inject doubt.145  Board members can be removed or 
step down and new ones can be appointed or elected.146  In short, 
when significant developments are subjected to the required 
process, predictability is not guaranteed.147
Most process managers will address predictability as the first 
order of business.
  Recognizing the fact 
that these situations are inherently complicated and ill suited for 
the required process, a properly designed collaborative process 
may actually present a more predictable option. 
148  They engage parties to establish procedures 
that will address a variety of circumstances.  How will we 
incorporate new information?  What responsibility do parties 
have?  How will we conduct our deliberations?  How do we 
integrate new parties into the process?  The best way to manage 
the uncertainty surrounding these questions and others is to 
create ground rules.149  There are many good examples of useful 
ground rules and what is appropriate depends on the situation.150
 
 144. Laws on vested rights, while varying from state to state, explain when an 
applicant’s rights to a particular approval become immutable or “vested.” In 
some states, an approval is not vested until the applicant has made significant 
investment and considerable construction. See MANDELKER, supra note 15, § 
6.12. 
  
By establishing and following these ground rules, the participants 
will construct a process of their own making.  The predictability 
 145. All local decisions can be appealed administratively or through the state 
court system. These appeals are costly and time consuming for all involved. By 
filing an appeal, an opponent can stall a project for years. See MANDELKER, 
supra note 15, §§ 8.12-.23. 
 146. Depending on the state and the type of board, members may be appointed 
or elected. 
 147. See BABCOCK, supra note 4. 
 148. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 118. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Interview with Mary Davis Hamlin, White Plains, New York,  (Oct. 
1999). Most ground rules call for respectful behavior to encourage productive 
deliberation. In some situations, ground rules such as “disagree without being 
disagreeable” will suffice. In other situations, where the environment is more 
hostile, more directive ground rules are required. For example, in a negotiation 
between animal rights advocates and trappers, one of the ground rules was 
“leave your guns at the door.” 
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achieved through this approach can be more durable and 
satisfying than what is offered by the required process.151
One of the most important ground rules is how decisions are 
made.
 
152  Being an ad hoc process, the participants must agree on 
how they are to agree.  Since the required process uses majority 
and supermajority voting, that is what most parties will be 
accustom to. Consensus and unanimity are more common in 
collaborative processes.153  Accordingly, parties usually employ 
some form of consensus as the grounds for reaching a decision.154
By advocating for an inclusive, transparent and responsive 
process, attorneys will be more likely to satisfy clients and 
themselves.  A process manager will have many strategies and 
techniques to meet these elements.
  
The creation and use of these ground rules makes the process 
more predictable and satisfying than the rigid required process. 
155
 E.  A Consensus Agreement Does Not Substitute for 
the Board’s Decision 
  Attorneys recommending 
that clients participate in a collaborative process should review a 
proposed design before committing.  If the three elements are not 
present, the client and attorney should contact the process 
manager to discuss deficiencies and design remedies.  Since 
process design in this arena is generally flexible, attorneys can 
expect to influence the design.  By contacting the process 
manager and raising concerns about perceived procedural 
deficiencies, the manager will have an opportunity to be 
responsive and either explain the design or make adjustments to 
build a better process. 
Many attorneys counsel clients against participating in a 
collaborative process arguing that it improperly delegates the 
 
 151. SUSSKIND, VAN DER WANSEM & CICCARELLI, supra note 103, at 17 
(reporting on a survey of 100 land use mediations where 84% of participants 
were satisfied with the process). 
 152. MOORE, supra note 85, at 430-31. 
 153. CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40, at 29. 
 154. Id. 
 155. SUSSKIND, MCKEARNAN & LARMER-THOMAS, supra note 93; GRAY, supra 
note 3; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 40; THEODORE W. KHEEL, THE KEYS 
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PROVEN METHODS OF SETTLING DISPUTES VOLUNTARILY 
(1999). 
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municipality’s authority to make decisions.156  The argument 
mischaracterizes the purpose of a collaborative process and 
misses a crucial step.  It assumes that the collaborative process is 
a substitute for the official decision-making process.  If this were 
the case, discouraging advice would be fitting.  However, in the 
consensus committees described above and according to best 
practices, the agreements reached are not substitutes for the 
required process.157  Instead, the agreement reached in the 
committee becomes part of the application submitted to the 
government and is then subject to a full review by the decision-
making body.158
Another misperception is that participation in the process 
ends when the agreement is reached.  Attorneys may counsel 
clients to avoid a consensus process because they fear it will limit 
their ability to participate during the required process.  This 
advice ignores the fact that an agreement of the committee does 
not amount to an official decision.  After the committee reaches 
agreement, the landowner uses the agreement to craft an 
application.
  As part of this review, the government still has 
its statutory authority to approve the application, impose 
conditions or deny.  Lawyers should be aware that, when 
following proper procedure, the consensus committee’s agreement 
supplements, not substitutes, the required process. 
159  Once it is submitted, the committee members can 
participate in the required process as members of the public, 
through public hearings, commenting on the deliberations.  
Participation in one process does not bar participation in the 
other.  In the second case study, the developer made a major 
change to the application by switching the golf course from public 
to private after the agreement had been reached.160
 
 156. See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory 
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1356 
(1997). 
  The 
committee members were furious with the change and made their 
opinions known to the government.  In response, the developer 
 157. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 3, at 143-
45. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Lawrence Susskind, Patrick Field & Alexis Gensberg, Building 
Consensus: Dealing with Controversial Land Use Issues & Disputes, 48 PLAN. 
COMM’R. J. 16, 19 (2002). 
 160. See supra Part II.B, para. 6. 
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explained the reason for the change and made accommodations to 
address their concerns.161
 F.  Agreements Must Be Monitored 
 
If an agreement is reached through a collaborative process, it 
must be converted into a proposal, submitted to the government 
and then, if approved, the project must be built.  Attorneys can 
help their clients by monitoring the required process and 
informing clients of important developments and relevant time 
frames.  Many parties assume that agreements reached in 
negotiation will not change and be approved, unaltered, by the 
government.  This is not always true in practice.  As a proposal 
passes through the required decision-making process new 
information comes to light and alterations to the proposal may be 
required.162
Assuming that the board approves a proposal that resembles 
the concept committee’s agreement, the next challenge is 
ensuring the project is built as approved.  Again, lawyers are 
perfectly situated to certify that construction is progressing 
consistent with the committee’s intent.  If construction deviates 
from the permitted approval, the attorney can quickly inform the 
participants and the error can be cured in a timely manner.
  So long as the parties involved consider them minor 
and agree with the rationale, these alterations may be 
appropriate.  In addition, non-lawyers may not be aware of what 
impact one decision in the required process will have on another.  
Lawyers can add value by monitoring any changes in the proposal 
and communicating the significance of those changes to the 
members of the committee. 
163
CONCLUSION 
  
By having attorneys monitor the implementation, parties can 
confidently return to their lives without fear that their hard work 
will be ignored. 
The author does not argue that collaborative approaches such 
as concept committees should replace the required decision-
 
 161. Id. 
 162. MILES ET AL., supra note 106, at 487-503. 
 163. SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES, supra note 3, at 187. 
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making process and that they are appropriate in all situations.  
Rather, the author argues for a supplemental collaborative 
process to be used in significant development decisions where the 
government has considerable discretion when reviewing an 
application, when some form of development is likely to occur, 
and when any governmental decision is likely to be challenged.  
The four cases in Part II offer evidence of how this can be done 
and Part III presents a framework to guide lawyers.  By 
supplementing the required process to deal with significant 
developments, lawyers can help communities improve their 
chances of attracting and approving the most appropriate projects 
while building civic capacity at a time when we desperately 
needed it.  While these processes may require more time and 
thought early on, the benefits achieved in the long term make the 
effort worthwhile. 
A review of these case studies reveals common elements that 
contributed to the success of the process.  First, someone was 
responsible for managing the process.  Second, the process was 
inclusive, transparent and responsive.  Third, information 
sharing and flexibility were encouraged.  Fourth, the collabor-
ation began early in the process.  Fifth, the process was supported 
and favored by the key parties including the decision-making 
boards.  The parties stated that a collaborative approach is more 
likely to produce a better project, help the parties share reliable 
and relevant information, use time more efficiently, conserve 
resources by pooling the efforts of many, reduce the need for 
multiple experts, and build relationships.  Based on their 
accounts and the results, we can see that interested process 
managers can help add collaborative elements to otherwise 
adversarial situations.  Well-informed lawyers can play an 
influential role advocating for sound collaborative approaches and 
making up for the lack of a neutral process manager. 
Attorneys who do not understand that these are 
supplemental processes will continue to discourage their use and 
miss opportunities to help their clients.  This is not to say that 
the required process should always be supplemented—as there 
are advantages to the required process.164
 
 164. See supra Part III.A. 
  Those advantages, 
however, should be weighed against the disadvantages so clients 
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can make an informed decision regarding process.  When clients 
are confronted with situations that are not appropriate for a strict 
adversarial environment, they need sound process advice from 
their counsel.  Without such advice, client’s needs go unmet and 
opportunities will be lost. 
Seizing the opportunities presented by significant 
development decisions is of critical importance locally to our 
communities and collectively to our nation.  Lawyers must 
actively promote and advance a new relationship with significant 
development decisions that not only protects against perils but 
also recognizes and takes advantage of inherent opportunities.  
Hopefully, this new relationship will set us on a course where 
more satisfying outcomes become the rule rather than the 
exception. 
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